















 The Irish Economy half a Century ago 
 
              Cormac Ó Gráda,  
              University College Dublin  
       
           WP08/18 
 





UCD SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN 






















Cormac Ó Gráda  
School of Economics 
UCD, Dublin 4 
[cormac.ograda@ucd.ie] 
                                                 
1 For publication in M. Miley, ed. An Foras Taluntais - 50 Years of Agriculture and 
Food Research (Dublin, 2008). THE IRISH ECONOMY HALF A CENTURY AGO 
 
 
Teagasc’s forerunner, An Foras Talúntais, was born at a time of economic 
gloom and crisis.  Towards the end of the same year when ‘an institute for 
agricultural research to be known as An Foras Talúntais’ was established, a key 
public policy document noted that ‘a sense of anxiety’ about Ireland’s economic 
prospects was indeed justified; ‘after 35 years of native government people are 
asking whether we can achieve an acceptable degree of economic progress’.2  
Almost simultaneously, in late 1958 the Irish Banking Review lamented that 
‘Ireland [had] been suffering from a mood of pessimism in recent years.  
Expressions of despair about the future…are heard on all sides’.  Two years 
earlier, the cover of the July 1956 issue of Dublin Opinion, capturing the 
despondency that ruled the Irish Republic in the mid-1950s, had borne a cartoon 
showing a map of Ireland with the caption, ‘Shortly Available: Underdeveloped 
Country: Unrivalled Opportunities: Magnificent Views, Political and Otherwise: 
Owners Going Abroad’. 
The widespread belief in the 1950s that Ireland’s economy was under-
performing is borne out by Figure 1, which describes the ratio of Irish to UK 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per head between 1938 and 1970.  Even before 
the outbreak of Word War II that ratio was almost certainly less than it had been 
at independence in 1921/2.  The impact of the war, which drove the ratio down 
                                                 
2 Department of Finance 1958: 5. 
  1to 0.4 in 1943, is striking.  The Emergency, as World War 2 was known in Ireland, 
proved conclusively that no economy is an island.  Then, after a short-lived post-
war recovery, in 1958 the ratio reached a new low point.  The huge fall in the 
ratio of Irish to British share prices between 1950 and 1958 also captures the 
dominant mood of economic pessimism. 
Given its relative backwardness, there was a presumption that the Irish 
economy should have grown faster than the British: standard growth theory 
argues for the conditional convergence of GDPs per head.3  However, Tables 1 
and 2, derived from economist Angus Maddison’s historical national accounts 
database, describe the growth in GDP and in GDP per head in Ireland and a 
selection of other countries between 1939 and 1958.4 The first block of economies 
in both tables was directly involved in World War II, while the second remained 
neutral.  Since Ireland (uniquely) lost population over this period, it fared better 
over the period as a whole in Table 2 than in Table 1.  Considering the sub-
periods, Ireland fared worst of the neutral economies in 1939-45, and only 
Franco’s Spain fared worse in 1945-50.  And Ireland fared worst of all economies 
in 1950-58, both in terms of GDP growth and GDP per capita growth. 
 
                                                 
3 Ó Gráda and O’Rourke 1996. 
4 Maddison’s data may be downloaded at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/.  They are also 
the source for Figure 1. 
 



















TABLE 1. GDP GROWTH RATES (% p.a.) 1939-58 
 
Country    1939-45 1945-50  1950-58 1939-58 
Austria   -14.1 15.7 5.9 2.2
Belgium   -3.0 5.3 2.6 1.6
Denmark   -1.8 7.4 2.6 2.5
Finland   0.5 5.5 4.2 3.4
France -11.3 15.4 4.4 2.3
Italy   -9.5 12.7 5.9 2.8
Netherlands   -11.2 17.8 4.0 2.9
Norway   -1.1 7.3 3.5 3.1
Greece   -16.9 14.9 6.4 1.3
United Kingdom   2.4 0.0 2.1 1.7
 
Ireland   -0.0 2.8 0.9 1.1
Sweden   2.5 4.9 3.0 3.3
Switzerland   4.1 4.4 4.0 4.1
Portugal   1.5 3.9 3.7 3.1
Spain   2.4 1.7 5.4 3.5
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TABLE 2.  GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATES (% p.a.), 1939-58 
 
Country    1939-45 1945-50  1950-58 1939-58 
Austria   -14.4 15.3 5.8 1.9
Belgium   -2.9 4.6 2.1 1.2
Denmark   -2.8 6.3 1.9 1.6
Finland   0.2 4.2 3.2 2.5
France -10.4 1.4 3.5 2.0
Italy   -10.1 1.2 5.3 2.2
Netherlands   -12.1 16.1 2.8 1.6
Norway   -1.8 6.2 2.5 2.1
Greece   -17.2 14.3 5.5 0.6
United Kingdom   2.0 -0.0 1.7 1.3
 
Ireland   -0.1 2.7 1.4 1.2
Sweden   1.7 3.8 2.3 2.5
Switzerland   3.3 3.1 2.7 3.0
Portugal   0.5 2.9 3.1 2.2




The economy’s dismal performance in the 1950s was mainly, though not 
entirely, the product of poor economic policies.  The lack of attractive foreign 
outlets for agricultural produce hurt, both during World War II and later.  Two 
other factors mattered more, however.  First, the strategy of import-substituting 
industrialization (ISI) practiced by all Irish administrations since the early 1930s 
had simply not worked.  Instead of generating an expanding, self-sustaining 
economy, less reliant on the land, it had resulted in an inefficient, highly 
protected manufacturing sector that produced a small range of products in small 
plants with short production runs.  An admittedly extreme example is the ‘best 
kip boots’ for men still produced by Hilliard & Palmer in 1959 for 56 shillings per 
pair, although there was only one worker left who could make them; the boots 
  4weighed three kilos per pair.5  Many firms simply produced or assembled 
foreign goods under license, without giving a thought to exports.   And as for 
exports, it is symptomatic that at a time when whiskey and linen accounted for 
the bulk of Irish manufactured exports to the United States, a senior member of 
the Marshall Plan mission to Ireland saw tourism and ‘smoked salmon, Belleek, 
special linen products, unusually [sic] printed books and cards’ as they only 
other potential prospects for earning scarce dollars.6
Second, short-run macroeconomic management in the post-war period 
was poor.  In retrospect, it is striking how heavily—nay, obsessively—economic 
commentary and policy focused on the balance of trade.  Thus, according to the 
New York Times (which in those days contained surprisingly frequent reports of 
Irish economic conditions), ‘Ireland betters position in trade’ (January 6 1953); 
‘the balance of payments has reached so dangerous a state of disequilibrium that 
we are within sight of national bankruptcy’ (July 29 1956, citing an Irish Times 
editorial); ‘Irish austerity balances trade: Dublin cuts imports’ (January 7 1958).  
An undue, neo-mercantilist focus on the gap between imports and exports led to 
a succession of stop-go measures that stifled the growth potential of the economy.  
The disastrous budget of 1952 was the work of Fianna Fáil’s Seán McEntee; in 
1956 Fine Gael’s Gerard Sweetman ushered through two deflationary budgets, 
the second of which—among other measures—increased levies on a wide range 
                                                 
5 Ó Gráda 1997: 52; Ó Gráda 2000. 
6 Cited in Ó Gráda 2000: 267. 
  5of ‘luxuries’ to a preferential rate of 40 per cent on imports from the United 
Kingdom, and 60 per cent on imports from most other countries.  The ensuing 
decline in consumption was drastic enough to restore the balance of payments.  
Both McEntee and Sweetman, following the conventional economic wisdom of 
the day, underestimated the ability of the macroeconomy and the balance of 
payments to self-correct.7   
 
 
THE VANISHING IRISH: 
The Republic’s population reached its post-famine nadir in 1961 at just 
over 2.8 million.  Emigration, which had fluctuated considerably since 
independence, was largely responsible for the decline.  Economic depression and 
the Second World War had reduced the rate of emigration since the early 1930s, 
but emigration took off again in the wake of World War II.  So much so that it 
prompted the Catholic hierarchy to express its alarm in public and to express in a 
private resolution sent to An Taoiseach its worries about ‘foreign agents [being] 
allowed to enter the country to attract girls abroad with promises of lucrative 
employment, the fulfillment of which no one in this country could control’8.  In 
fact the scale of such operations was exaggerated, but the emigration of 
adolescents, particularly girls, would continue to worry the bishops and others.  
                                                 
7 Honohan and Ó Gráda 1998. 
8 Ó Gráda 1997: 212. 
  6The creation of a commission to inquire into ‘emigration and other population 
problems’ in 1948 was in part a response to such commentary.  The experts 
produced no panacea, however, and their much delayed report—which did not 
appear until 1956—was very short on policy recommendations.9   
During the second half of the 1950s the net outflow reached levels not 
matched in proportionate terms since the 1880s.  Most of those who left headed 
for Britain.10  Most, male and female, were literate but otherwise poorly skilled 
workers from rural backgrounds.  Still, the significant emigration of skilled, 
better educated emigrants in this period—doctors, engineers, architects, nurses—
is a reminder that while high levels of education may have been a necessary 
condition for economic growth, they were no guarantee of it.  In the late 1950s 
Irish medical schools were producing ‘about 360’ new physicians, of whom only 
about one-third could be absorbed in Ireland.11  This may mean that Ireland was 
over-investing in third-level education in the 1950s, in the sense that the benefits 
were being reaped where people emigrated, not in Ireland. 
Much has changed in the interim.  In an address to Irish fund-raisers in 
late 2007 former Coca-Cola president Donald Keough warned of the costs of 
Ireland becoming more ‘mentally distant’ for Irish-America.12  This seems 
inevitable, given that the virtual embargo on Irish immigration to the U.S. 
between 1931 and 1945, followed by a restrictive immigration regime thereafter, 
                                                 
9 Daly 2006: 172-79. 
10 The best account is Delaney 2007. 
11 NYT, July 7th 1957. 
12 Irish Times, November 8th 2007. 
  7forced most Irish emigrants to head east rather than west.  Still, emigration to the 
U.S. on a modest scale resumed after the war, and in the 1950s Irish politicians, 
desperate for foreign exchange, sought to tap the American market for nostalgia.  
In 2007 Keough spoke of Ireland’s 70 million-strong diaspora; in 1955 William 
Norton, Minister for Industry and Commerce, spoke more modestly of ‘the 
20,000,000 people of Irish stock in the United States [who] might be induced to 
buy even a pounds worth (or $2.80) of Irish goods on a St. Patrick’s Day, or 
during that week [as] a practical way…of helping the Irish economy to the tune 





The success of the Celtic Tiger between the late 1980s and the mid-2000s 
has been linked, plausibly, to the enticements offered by Ireland’s business-
friendly tax regime to foreign, and particularly US, multinational corporations.  
Without access to foreign markets provided by the European Economic 
Community (which Ireland joined in 1973) and the Single European Act (1986) 
such a strategy would not have worked so well.  The switch from a policy of 
penalizing importers to one of subsidizing exporters dates back to the 1950s, 
however.   
                                                 
13 NYT, Aug 28 1955. 
  8In the 1950s few Irish manufacturers focused on export markets.  Those 
who did so were overwhelmingly dependent on the British market.  From the 
early 1950s on, as the failure of the domestic market to deliver sustainable 
growth became increasingly obvious, policy shifted cautiously away from ISI.  
The focus on export-oriented subsidiaries of multinationals was politically 
attractive, since it did not threaten existing indigenous firms directly.  By 1955 
Irish delegations were visiting Sweden, Germany, and the U.S. seeking foreign 
investment.   
The package of incentives they offered was remarkably similar to that 
already available in Northern Ireland since the early post-war period. The shift 
towards reliance on foreign capital in the Republic was thus not merely a 
question of soul-searching based on experience since the 1930s.  The authorities 
in the mid-1950s cannot but have been aware of Northern Ireland’s relative 
success in attracting foreign investment and of the relative buoyancy of the 
Northern economy.   Northern policy, directed through the Northern Ireland 
Development Council (NIDC), sought to compensate for employment losses 
from the decline of traditional industries and to diversify the Northern Ireland 
economy.   It offered aspiring investors grants and loans for premises, plant, and 
machinery. An aggressive marketing campaign included a series of large 
advertisements in the London Times in 1957, and repeated press announcements 
of new firms and expansion schemes. By late 1957 Northern Ireland could boast 
  9130 new industrial establishments since 1945, most British, six American.14  In 
late 1958 NIDC announced that it had aided 22 new firms and seven expansion 
schemes in the previous three years, projects which, when fully operational, 
would employ 6,500 men and 900 women.  In October 1958 it announced the 
subsidiary of the eighth American firm to establish a base in Northern Ireland, a 
Texas company producing valves for oil wells in Carnmoney (near Belfast), 
which would employ about sixty males and export to ‘all the oil-producing areas 
of the world except the United States’15.  If the South would later steal a march on 
the North with its policy of low taxes on corporate profits, then Northern 
industrial development policy was the more innovative in the 1950s. 
William Norton was a vigorous proponent of the new approach.  Both he 
and his successor, Seán Lemass, envisaged export-oriented manufacturing 
industries servicing a European free trade area from bases in Ireland as the way 
forward.16  Thus on 11th March 1958 Lemass announced new incentives for 
industrial investment (a five year exemption from taxation on all profits derived 
from exports, plus complete freedom to repatriate profits) and the expansion of 
free trade operations at Shannon (low rent on sites, construction grants, no tariffs 
on imports of raw materials).  The success of such measures was predicated on 
expected Irish membership of a broader European free trade area.  It would take 
some years for this policy shift to bear fruit. 
                                                 
14 NYT, Nov 27th 1957. 
15 The Times, Nov 11th 1958; NYT, Oct 9th 1958. 
16 Horgan 1998: 167-68. 
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AGRICULTURE: 
Today agriculture accounts for only 2 per cent of GDP and 5 per cent of 
the labour force.  Half a century ago, those percentages were about 25 and 35 per 
cent, respectively.  Farming offered full-time employment to over 0.4 million 
males in 1957/58 (not to mention the number of full-time female equivalents), 
while live animals and food products accounted for over half of the revenue 
generated by exports.  Farming mattered then, but its poor record affected the 
economy at large.  Part of the problem was that since the 1930s farmers in the 
Republic had lacked the advantages in terms of market access and subsidization 
available to their Northern neighbours; the growing divergence between the 
composition of agricultural output in the two Irelands between the 1930s and the 
1960s and its subsequent convergence in the wake of EEC membership is 
significant in this respect.17  In addition, World War II had prevented Irish 
agriculture from fully exploiting its comparative advantage in dairying and meat 
exports, and had left it badly undercapitalized.  An expert from New Zealand 
employed by Agriculture Minister James Dillon produced a report indicating 
that ‘there is no area of comparable size in the northern hemisphere which has 
such marvelous potentialities for pasture production’18, but that potential was 
compromised by soil exhaustion and the under-use of lime and phosphates in 
                                                 
17 Ó Gráda 2000: 275-76. 
18 Holmes 1948: 8. 
  11the wake of the Emergency.  In Dillon’s picturesque assessment, Irish grass 
‘would fill a cow’s stomach and yet let her die of starvation where she stood’.  
The Irish Grassland Association, founded in 1946, was born of such concerns and 
anticipated the kind of cooperation between researcher and farmer associated 
with Johnstown Castle, acquired by the Department of Agriculture in 1945 and 
handed over to Teagasc’s forerunner, An Foras Talúntais in 1959.  Ireland’s 
fertilizer deficiency backlog, a major policy preoccupation in the 1950s, would 
take a long time to eliminate, but the consumption of lime and fertilizers rose by 
almost two-fifths between 1957 and 1962.   
A pioneering survey carried out by the Central Statistics Office with the 
‘wholehearted cooperation’ of farmers in the mid-1950s confirmed the low 
incomes earned by a majority of farmers at that time.  At the same time, it 
implied—after leaving out of account mini-holdings of less than five acres—an 
average farm family income of nearly £500, at a time when the average industrial 
worker earned £350-£450 a year.  Inequality on the land was considerable: 
applying the Central Statistics Office’s estimates of family income to official data 
on the size distribution of holdings suggests that one-tenth of farmers with 
holdings of 100 acres or more accounted for nearly one-quarter of family income. 
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Table 3: FARM INCOMES IN THE 1950s 
Farm size (acres)  No. of farms in 
survey 
Income per farm 
(£) 
No. of holdings in 
country (1955) 
5-15 108  209  59,066 
15-30 265  332  83,896 
30-50 287  464  63,080 
50-100 284  697  52,270 
100-200 151  1,034  21,930 
200 +  79  1,425  7,152 
Total 1,174    287,394 
Source: Ó Gráda 1997: 161 
 
 
In the mid-1950s, as noted, agriculture accounted for the bulk of Irish 
exports.  However, competition from Argentina and the UK system of deficiency 
payments (which kept UK prices below world levels for consumers, but 
compensated farmers accordingly) militated against production and exports.  
Between mid-1955 and mid-1956 the price of prime bullocks dropped from £9 to 
£6 per cwt, while Irish bacon was being priced out of the British market.19
Between 1949/51 and 1959/61 net agricultural output (including turf) rose 
by 17.7 per cent.  Nevertheless, the productivity of Irish agriculture in these years 
remained low relative to both Northern Ireland and Great Britain.  Tens of 
thousands of farms remained uneconomic; the average farmer was poorly 
educated; policy (as already noted) diverted farmers away from their 
comparative advantage in milk and beef; and much of the land was in poor 
                                                 
19 NYT, July 29, 1956. 
  13condition.  The sector’s underperformance was the stimulus for both Joseph 
Johnston’s Irish Agriculture in Transition (1951) and Raymond Crotty’s Irish 
Agricultural Production (1966). 
  Agriculture also naturally played a major role in Dr. T.K. Whitaker’s 
Economic Development.  Eight of its twenty-four chapters were devoted to 
agriculture, which also featured prominently in several other chapters.   Given 
manifold constraints, including the lack or markets, underinvestment, the high 
average age and poor education of farmers, and the large number of uneconomic 
holdings, Whitaker declared that it would not be easy ‘to break out of the vicious 
circle of low production at high cost’.  In a stinging critique of the role of 
agriculture in the universities, Economic Development declared that in view of An 
Foras Talúntais’s need to hire trained staff, the time had come to reassess the role 
of UCD’s Faculty of Agriculture.  The ensuing Programme for Economic Expansion 
(1959-62) expected very modest growth from the farm sector.   
  It is significant too that today’s two main farming organizations were 
founded in the 1950s.  The National Farmer’s Association (predecessor of the IFA) 
held its inaugural meeting on January 6th 1955, followed by a formal dinner at 
the Royal Hibernian Hotel—an event far removed from the everyday lives of 
most farmers of the day.  In its early days, the NFA was led by a group of 
gentleman-farmers, with the leisure and education to organize; they included a 
wealthy Argentine-born tillage farmer, a Cavan-based old Clongownian, and a 
Donegal Presbyterian who cited papal encyclicals without scruple when the 
  14occasion demanded. Within a few years, angered at gains made by public sector 
workers, the NFA was claiming that it would take £83 million—presumably in 
transfers from the rest of the community—for farmers to regain the relative 
status they had in 1953.  This claim prompted Taoiseach Seán Lemass to warn of 
‘the futility of relying on a statistical approach to the problem’20.  The NFA’s 
main rival, the Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers’ Association, had been formed five 
years earlier.  As its name implies, it was strongest in the dairying areas, and so 
its council held its inaugural meeting in Cruises Hotel, Limerick.  Formed in 
response to Agriculture Minister James Dillon’s decision to cut the price of milk 
back from 14d to 12d per gallon, it too acquired a reputation for militancy.  A 
third farming organization, Macra na Feirme, had been founded in 1944 as an 
instrument for educating young farmers in a social setting.  One of its founding 





For all the gloom and doom, there were signs too in 1957/58 that change 
was afoot.  On August 8th 1957, Ireland joined both the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank.  In July 1958, the Industrial Development 
(Encouragement of External Investment) Act removed many of the remaining 
                                                 
20 Cited in Ó Gráda 1997: 159; see also Daly 2002: 372-85. 
  15restrictions of the Control of Manufactures Acts, which had discriminated 
against foreign capital since the 1930s.  Three years later, Ireland applied for full 
membership of the European Economic Community. 
In the late 1950s something changed in the economy, and Ireland entered 
a period of economic growth that would last for several years.  Motor vehicle 
registrations, one plausible proxy for consumer confidence, suggest widespread 
gloom between early 1956 and mid-1957; car sales then began to rise, being two-
fifths higher in 1960 than in 1959, and annual sales would continue to rise for 
several years thereafter.  Comparing the percentage change in ordinary share 
values in Ireland and the UK indicate that Irish investors began to show clear 
signs of greater ‘bullishness’ from early 1960 on.  Net emigration, a sensitive 
marker of economic performance, would be lower between 1961 and 1966 than 
during any intercensal period since independence. 
There is still no consensus as to why the shift happened.  Writing in 1971, 
the late F.S.L. Lyons claimed that the Department of Finance’s Economic 
Development were crucial: ‘it is hardly too much to say…that even today it can be 
seen as a watershed in the modern economic history of the country’21.  Whitaker, 
main author of Economic Development and the ensuing Programme for Economic 
Expansion, held that ‘objective students of our past philosophy and performance’ 
would find it hard to dismiss the ‘psychological stimulus of planning between 
                                                 
21 Lyons 1971: 628. 
  161958 and 1963’22. Although accorded an important role in Irish accounts23, it is 
curious how the foreign press made little or nothing of Economic Development or 
the Programme for Economic Expansion.  In retrospect, the focus on agriculture and 
tourism in those documents seems excessive, but their insistence on the need for, 
and possibility of, even modest economic growth was significant.  Others factors 
posited include the election as Taoiseach of Seán Lemass in June 1959; 
investments made in social overhead capital during the 1950s beginning to bear 
fruit; and the rapid growth of Ireland’s trading partners and a commitment to 
trade liberalization giving the fillip to growth at home.  Or perhaps all of these 
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